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Abstract—Communications aided by low-altitude unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) have emerged as an effective solution to
provide large coverage and dynamic capacity for both military
and civilian applications, especially in unexpected scenarios.
However, because of their broad coverage, UAV communications
are prone to passive eavesdropping attacks. This paper analyzes
the secrecy performance of UAVs networks at the millimeter wave
(mmWave) band and takes into account unique features of air-to-
ground channels and practical constraints of UAV deployment.
To be specific, it explores the 3D antenna gain in the air-to-
ground links and uses the Mate´rn hardcore point process to
guarantee the safety distance between the randomly deployed
UAV base stations. In addition, we propose the transmit jamming
strategy to improve the secrecy performance in which part
of UAVs send jamming signals to confound the eavesdroppers.
Simulation results verify our analysis and demonstrate the impact
of different system parameters on the achievable secrecy rate. It
is also revealed that optimizing the density of jamming UAVs will
significantly improve security of UAV-enabled networks.
Index Terms—Unmanned aerial vehicles, physical layer secu-
rity, Mate´rn hardcore process, millimeter wave (mm-wave), 3D
antenna pattern.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications networks have experienced un-
precedented data growth and the resulting need for high-speed
ubiquitous and irregular access is beyond the capabilities of
existing infrastructures [1]. Current terrestrial communication
systems are rigidly planned based on the long-term traffic
statistics, and cannot cope with the unexpected and temporary
demands in festival events, search and rescue, etc. Recently
low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flying at several
hundred metres to a few kilometres have attracted growing
interest in providing agile communications because of their
mobility and elevated positions [2, 3]. Compared to the terres-
trial systems, UAVs can overcome the propagation constraints
due to terrain characteristics and augment the coverage area.
UAV base stations (BSs) can also be rapidly deployed, thus
address the capital expenditure and operating expenses issues
in future networks, which cannot be handled alone by the
current terrestrial systems.
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Security is a major concern that hinders the wide de-
ployment of UAV-enabled communication networks. Due to
the inherent broadcasting nature of wireless communications
and the broad coverage area, UAV-enabled communication
networks – whether civil or military – are particularly prone to
security threats. To guarantee perfect security, eavesdroppers
need to be prevented from decoding any message intended
to legitimate users. Existing security schemes are typically
implemented at the higher layers based on the computational
hardness via encryption schemes [4].
In contrast to the conventional cryptographic based methods,
security has also been addressed using information-theoretic
and signal processing approaches at the physical layer. There
have been significant research efforts in ensuring secure wire-
less communications at the physical layer to prevent malicious
eavesdroppers from decoding the message [5] [6]. In this
regard, the secrecy rate, which can be transmitted both reliably
and securely without any use of a formal crypto system, has
been adopted as a useful performance metric to measure the
system security against passive eavesdropping attacks. Secure
connections from a typical multi-antenna transmitter to the
multiple legitimate receivers have been studied in [7] over
Rayleigh fading channels, where both the legitimate nodes
and eavesdroppers’ distributions are modelled as Poisson
point processes (PPPs). Furthermore, the resource optimization
problem for secure connections in multi-user dual-hop relay
networks is proposed in [8]. The power minimization problem
for a single antenna multicasting secrecy network is studied
in [9].
There have been very few works that investigate the se-
crecy performance of UAV networks. The secrecy energy
efficiency in UAV-enabled communication network is analyzed
in Rayleigh fading channels where UAVs’ distribution is
modelled as a PPP [10]. In [11], UAVs are employed as
mobile relays to maximize the secrecy rate in a four-node
channel setup including a source, a destination, a buffer-aided
mobile relay, and an eavesdropper, and it is shown that mobile
relays can improve the secrecy performance compared to static
relaying. However, existing works in physical layer security for
UAV networks have not considered the unique air-to-ground
channel characteristics and the 3D antenna gain, and often
ignore the safety requirements on the UAV deployment.
This paper aims to analyze the secrecy performance of
UAV-enabled millimeter wave (mmWave) networks taking into
account the above mentioned factors. In the considered system,
UAVs act as flying BSs serving legitimate ground receivers
in the presence of ground eavesdroppers, and no terrestrial
infrastructure is available. Below we first review the relevant
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2literature.
A. Related Works
1) UAV coverage: Coverage optimization and analysis is
an important and universal issue for UAV communications, in
applications such as UAV-enabled networks, information dis-
semination and data collection. Assuming deterministic UAV
locations, the coverage radius has been derived as a function
of the path loss in [12]. When there is no accurate information
about UAVs’ locations, it is reasonable to assume UAVs are
randomly deployed and to employ stochastic geometry to
analyze the coverage performance. In the literature, the UAVs’
distribution is normally modelled as a PPP. An analytical
expression for the coverage probability is provided in [13]
as a function of the UAV parameters in a low-altitude urban
environment, and the tradeoff between the UAV’s density and
height has also been studied. When there is a small number
of UAVs deployed to cover a given area, the binomial point
process is used to model the UAVs’ spatial distribution in
[14], where the overage probability for a Nakagami-m fading
channel is derived.
2) UAV deployment: UAV deployment is a closely related
issue to improve coverage, and presents unique challenges
because it needs to jointly consider multiple systems param-
eters such as elevation angle, directional antennas and flight
altitudes of the UAVs [3]. The coverage radius is maximized
by optimizing the UAV altitude in the single-UAV deployment
in [12], and it is extended to the deployment of two interfering
UAVs to maximize the coverage area in [15]. UAV deployment
may cause significant interference to ground terminals. It was
noted in [16] that reducing the altitude difference between
BS antennas and user equipment antennas is necessary to
overcome the degradation in the area spectral efficiency in
ultra-dense small-cell networks. Energy-efficient UAV-BSs de-
ployment is studied in [17] that maximizes the number of
covered users using the minimum transmit power. A novel
UAV-satellite communication system has been investigated in
[18], where the key challenge of unstable beam pointing is
addressed.
3) 3D mmWave antennas: Because of the elevated posi-
tions, 3D mmWave antenna model is necessary for modelling
UAV air-to-ground communications links, but this has only
been studied in terrestrial networks. The impact of 3D BS
antenna pattern on the heterogeneous cellular network is
studied in [19], and it also discusses the antenna patterns
in micro-cell BSs and pico-cell BSs, respectively. The 3D
mmwave antenna gain pattern is derived in [20] which could
be generalized to handle the 3D locations of the transmitters
relative to the receiver and be applied to the UAV-ground
mmWave communications.
4) Mate´rn Hardcore point process: Another unique feature
of UAV deployment different from the terrestrial BS deploy-
ment is that UAVs need to maintain the minimum safety
distance. The widely used PPP model [21] cannot satisfy
this requirement. In the literature of spatial stochastic point
processes, the Mate´rn Hardcore (MHC) point process is the
most appropriate model to incorporate the UAV minimum
separation distance requirement, in which points are forbidden
to be closer to each other than a certain minimum distance
[21]. Recently analysis of the repulsion between BSs in 2D
terrestrial wireless networks has attracted much interest. An
energy efficiency approach for the multi-user multi-antenna
MHC wireless networks is proposed in [22], whilst the MHC
point process is used to model the reject region with each
BS in sub-6 GHz cellular networks in [23]. To the best of
our knowledge, the MHC point process has not been used in
modelling UAVs’ spatial distribution.
5) Intentional jamming: Jamming or artificial noise is an
effective way to enhance the secrecy rate by emitting radio
interference to confuse the eavesdroppers [24, 25]. The trans-
mit jamming can be introduced by either embedding it within
the intended signals using multiple antennas at the transmitter
[26], or sending it from a full-duplex receiver [27], or by
employing external relay jammers [28–31]. However, it is
unknown whether transmit jamming can bring any security
benefit to UAV networks because not only using part of UAVs
to send jamming signals will reduce the number of UAV
BSs, but the quality of received signals at both the legitimate
receivers and eavesdroppers will be degraded by jamming.
Considering the jamming power constraint, a joint relay and
jammer selection scheme is proposed in [32] to improve the
physical-layer security of a wireless relay system with multiple
jamming nodes and one relay node.
B. Contributions and Organization
In this paper, we use stochastic geometry to examine the se-
crecy performance of randomly deployed UAV-enabled multi-
antenna mmWave communication networks in Nakagami-m
fading channels considering both line-of-sight (LoS) and non-
line-of-sight (NLoS) links, realistic 3D antenna gains, and
UAV safety distances. We further propose the transmit jam-
ming approach to improve the achievable secrecy rate. This
is in stark contrast to existing work which considers Rayleigh
fading [10], single antennas without fading [11], 2D mmWave
antenna patterns [33] and no minimum distance between UAVs
[34]. In addition, jamming has not been studied in UAV
networks. The main contributions of this paper are summarized
as follows.
• Small-scale fading: The mmWave links are modeled as
Nakagami-m fading which is generic enough to incor-
porate both LoS and NLoS air-to-ground channels. This
allows to characterize the dependence of the secrecy rate
on key system parameters such as transmission power,
densities of UAVs and eavesdroppers, number of antennas
and flight altitudes.
• 3D beamforming: We develop a realistic approach to
model the 3D antenna beamforming gain in mmWave
links considering the azimuth angle, as well as elevation
and depression angles for UAVs and ground terminals re-
spectively, which gives rise to characterize the connection
ranges for the air-to-ground links. The results show that
decreasing the antenna gain for the ground nodes will
reduce the coverage range.
• UAV minimum distance: We use an MHC point process
to model the UAVs’ locations, such that UAVs’ minimum
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3Fig. 1: Illustration of the system model.
safety distance can be guaranteed in the model and
secrecy analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first time the MHC point process is used in a 3D
propagation model.
• Transmit jamming: We propose that part of UAVs can
be used to transmit jamming signals to make eaves-
dropping harder. The results show that optimizing the
jamming UAV density can indeed improve the secrecy
rate compared to the no transmit jamming case.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section
II presents the UAV network model. Section III introduces
the MHC point process and user association. The derivations
for the secrecy rates with and without transmit jamming are
given in Section IV and Section V, respectively. Numerical
results and discussions are provided in Section VI, followed
by concluding remarks in Section VII.
II. NETWORK MODEL
We consider a downlink mmWave system in which UAVs
serve as aerial BSs to provide wireless connectivity to le-
gitimate ground receivers, in the presence of multiple eaves-
droppers on the ground, as shown in Fig. 1. The locations of
UAV-enabled BSs are modelled as an MHC point process ΦU
with density λU, and the eavesdroppers’ distribution follows a
PPP ΦE with density λE, and we also assume that all UAV-
enabled BSs are elevated at the same altitude HU  0. For
simplicity, the typical receiver is associated with the closest
UAV BS. In the following, we will describe in detail the LoS
probability, small scale fading, antenna gain and derive the
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) expressions for
both the typical receiver and the eavesdroppers.
LoS probability: Due to the blockage effect in the air-to-
ground links, we use the point process ΦLU to denote LoS UAV
BSs, and ΦNU = ΦU/Φ
L
U to denote NLoS UAV BSs. Define
pU,L(ϕ) as the probability of the LoS link, where ϕ is the
elevation angle from the UAV to the typical receiver. Because
UAVs are deployed at the same altitude, we rewrite pU,L(ϕ)
as pU,L(x), where x is the horizontal distance from the UAV
BS to the typical receiver, and denote pU,N(x) = 1− pU,L(x)
as the probability of the NLoS link.
Small scale fading: We use independent Nakagami-m
fading for the LoS link and the NLoS link respectively.
Fig. 2: Illustration of the antenna gain. As the figure shown, C`
is the maximum connection distance range for the ground node
(eavesdropper shown), the black double sided arrow denoted
the uniform range for depression angle ϕU and elevation angle
ϕ` range in [−pi, 0] and [ θ`e2 , pi − θ
`
e
2 ] respectively. The sub
figure shows the projection of 3D antenna beamforming, and
the azimuth angle is uniform in the range of [−pi, pi] .
Nakagami-m fading covers a wide range of fading scenarios
in realistic wireless applications via the m parameter, which
includes the Rayleigh fading (m = 1) as a special case. The
LoS link and the NLoS link have their own Nakagami fading
parameters mL and mN, respectively1.
3D antenna gain: Suppose each UAV BS is equipped with
NU transmit antennas, and each ground receive terminal has
N` receive antennas, where the index ` ∈ {R, E} denotes the
typical receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. Because of
the UAVs’ altitude, all antennas adopt a 3D sectorized model,
and the gain pattern is given by G(θa, θe/d), where θa is the
antenna 3-dB beamwidth for the azimuth orientation in the
horizontal direction and θe/d is the antenna 3-dB beamwidth
for the elevation/depression angles in the ground/air node, with
main-lobe antenna gain GM, and side-lobe gain Gm.
The directional antenna gain and the associated probability
can be approximated by the formulas below [20] for the UAV
and the ground terminal (legitimate receiver or eavesdropper),
respectively:
GUi =

GUM, P
U
M =
θUa
2pi
· θ
U
d
pi
GUm, P
U
m = 1−
θUa
2pi
· θ
U
d
pi
, (1)
and
G`j =

G`M, P
`
M =
θ`a
2pi
· θ
`
e
pi − θ`e
G`m, P
`
m = 1−
θ`a
2pi
· θ
`
e
pi − θ`e
. (2)
Notice that GUi in (1) is the array gain at the UAV BS, where
i = M denoted the main lobe directivity gain and i = m is
the side-lobe gain. The azimuth angle ψU is uniform in the
range of [−pi, pi] and the depression angle ϕU for the UAV
node is uniform in [−pi, 0] which is shown in Fig. 2. We have
the corresponding probabilities PUM and P
U
m for the main-lobe
and the side-lobe, respectively.
1We assume that both mL and mN are positive integers, and mL ≥ 2
holds for the dominant LoS transmission in the LoS link.
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4Similarly, we have the array gain for the typical receiver
and the eavesdropper in (2), where j ∈ {M,m} denoted the
main lobe directivity gain and the side-lobe gain respectively.
Different from the UAV node, we have to take into account the
worst case situation for the elevation angle at ground terminals
as shown in Fig. 2 with red arrows. The azimuth angle of
ground terminals is uniform in the range of ϕ` ∈ [ θ`e2 , pi− θ
`
e
2 ],
so we only consider the case when ϕ` ≥ θ`e2 or ϕ` ≤ pi − θ
`
e
2
in order to have a reliable connection, which means θ
`
e
2 is the
minimum elevation angle. This leads to the following results
about the connection distance.
Corollary 1: We define the maximum connection distances
CR and CE as the maximum UAV coverage ranges in the hor-
izontal direction for the typical receiver and the eavesdropper,
respectively, and both of them are restricted by the elevation
angle in the following way:
CR =
HU
tan (θRe/2)
, (3)
CE =
HU
tan (θEe/2)
, (4)
where ϕR = θRe/2 and ϕ
E = θEe/2 are the minimum elevation
angles. Beyond these distances, no reliable connection can be
established.
The SINR of the ground receiver: Based on the above as-
sumptions on the UAV deployment, the air-to-ground channel
model and the antenna gain, the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) received from the associated UAV at the
typical receiver can be expressed as
SINRR =
PU|ho|2GUMGRML (|LR,o|)
IR + σ2 , (5)
where the PU is transmit power of the UAV BS. The path
loss function is defined as L (|LR,o(x)|) = βLR,o(x)−αq , and
LR,o(x) =
(
x2 +HU
2
)1/2
is the distance from the typical re-
ceiver to the associated UAV, x is the corresponding horizontal
distance, β is the frequency dependent constant parameter and
αq is path loss exponent, where the sub-index q = L if it is
associated with an LoS link, and q = N if it is associated with
an NLoS link. The interference from both LoS and NLoS links
is denoted as IR =
∑
l∈ΦU/o
PU|hl|2GUiGRjL (|LR,l|), and |ho|2
and |hl|2 are the normalized Gamma random variables, which
correspond to independent Nakagami-m fading gain with the
parameter mq from distances LR,o(x) and LR,l(x), and σ2 is
the noise power.
SINR of the eavesdropper: We assume the worst case
eavesdropping scenario, where all the eavesdroppers can can-
cel the interference from non-associated UAVs [35]. We also
assume the legitimate receiver’s channel and the eavesdrop-
per’s channel are independent of each other. Then the signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) in the worst case is written as
SNRE∗ = max
e∈ΦE
{
PU|he|2GUiGEjL (|Le,o|)
σ2E
}
, (6)
where Le,o is the distance between the associated UAV BS
and the eavesdropper where e ∈ ΦE, σ2E is the noise power.
GEj is the 3-D antenna gain seen from the eavesdropper.
III. MATE´RN HARDCORE BASED UAV DEPLOYMENT
A unique feature of the UAV deployment is that the min-
imum safety distance needs to be guaranteed between UAVs
and this section is devoted to model the UAVs distribution with
this constraint based on the type-II MHC point process [21].
The MHC is a repulsion point process which mathematically
represents the minimum distance ρ between all pairs of UAV
nodes, where ρ HU.
To model the MHC point process based UAV distribution
ΦU, we first generate the distribution where UAVs are deployed
according to a PPP, which is denoted by ΦP with density
λP. Each point d ∈ ΦP then associates a mark d ∼ U [0, 1]
independent of any other point, where U [a, b] denotes the
uniform distribution in [a, b]. At last, compare each two points,
retain the point d only when d is the lowest mark compared to
all points inside a circle centered at the point d with a radius
ρ [23], as illustrated in Fig. 3.
Since the distribution of ΦU in the MHC point process is
generated by a dependent thinning process of a stationary PPP
ΦP, we have the thinning probability pt = λUλP where all the
points in ΦP marked as a circle centred at each point with a
radius ρ shown in Fig. 3. So we have the retaining probability
pt for an arbitrary access point d in ΦU as
pt =
P(x < ρ)
λPpiρ2
=
1− exp(−λPpiρ2)
λPpiρ2
. (7)
Based on (7) and pt = λUλP , we can derive the first order
product density of the MHC point process ΦU below:
ζ(1) = λU =
1− exp(−λPpiρ2)
piρ2
. (8)
Given the density of the UAV BSs λU, we can figure out the
required density of the PPP λP as:
λP = −
ln
(
1− λUpiρ2
)
piρ2
. (9)
From (9), it is clearly seen that λU is restricted and cannot be
arbitrarily high. To be specific, λU should satisfy λU <
1
piρ2
to make the MHC based distribution feasible.
Next we can derive the second order product density of the
MHC point process ΦU [23] which is given by
ζ(2) (u) =

λU
2 =
(
1− exp(−λPpiρ2)
piρ2
)2
, 2ρ < u
2Vρ (u)
(
1− e−λppiρ2
)
piρ2Vρ (u) [Vρ (u)− piρ2]
− 2piρ
2
(
1− e−λPVρ(u))
piρ2Vρ (u) [Vρ (u)− piρ2] , ρ < u < 2ρ
0, u < ρ
, (10)
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(a) PPP with λP = 50/km2.
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(b) MHC point process with λU = 50/km2, ρ = 50m.
Fig. 3: A realization of the PPP and the MHC point process
with the same density λP = λU = 50/km2. In Fig. 3(a), a
dashed line circle around every point to help understand the
intensity of each point in the PPP network. In Fig. 3(b), a node
d is selected if it has the lowest mark compared to all points
inside a circle centered at the point d with a radius ρ. In the
figure, the central points of red circles need to be removed.
We can see that both processes have the same density, but the
MHC point process is more evenly distributed than the PPP.
where Vρ (u) in (10) denotes the area of the green union which
is shown in Fig. 4 when two circles with the same radius ρ
are separated by a distance u, which is given by
Vρ (u) =

2piρ2, u > 2ρ
2piρ2 − 2ρ2cos−1( u2ρ ) + u
√
ρ2 − u24 , ρ < u ≤ 2ρ
0, 0 < u ≤ ρ
.
(11)
For a stationary point process ΦU, using Campbell’s theorem
[21, 36], we can deduce that the average number of interfering
UAV BSs contained in the UAV distribution ΦU, excluding the
Fig. 4: Illustration of the repulsive point model. x is the
horizontal distance between the associated UAV BS ’o’ and
the typical receiver, and point B is the projection of the typical
receiver onto the UAV plane. Point A denotes an interference
UAV. ϑ is the angle between ∠AoB’, where u is the horizontal
distance between the associated UAV BS and the interfering
UAV BS. R(u) denotes the horizontal distance between the
typical receiver and the interfering UAV BS. The green region
represents the area of union of two discs of radius ρ.
associated UAV at the origin ’o’, is given by
E!o
[∑
z∈ΦU
g (z)
]
= λU
−1
∫
R2
ζ(2) (u) g (z) dz, (12)
where R2 → [0,∞] is a measurable integrable function, and
g(z) is the path loss function equation [37].
In addition, given that the distance between the typical
receiver and the associated UAV is L(x) =
√
H2U + x
2 2,
the approximated user association probability density function
(pdf) is given by [23]:
f|lR,o|(L(x)) = 2piλUL(x) exp(−λUpiL(x)2). (13)
Because all UAV-enabled BS are deployed at the same
altitude HU and L(x) =
√
H2U + x
2, we can simply transform
the approximated user association pdf as follows:
f|lR,o|(x) = 2piλUx exp(−piλUx2). (14)
IV. SECRECY EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the average achievable secrecy
rate in the considered UAV-enabled mmWave networks. The
average secrecy rate between the associated UAV BS and the
typical receiver is defined as
RSec = [ RR −RE∗ ] + , (15)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}. The average rates of the typical
receiver RR and the most detrimental eavesdropper RE∗ are
expressed as
RR = E [log2(1 + SINRR)] =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
Pcov,R(γ)
1 + γ
dγ, (16)
2Since HU  ρ, we can easly derive that L(x) ρ.
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6and
RE∗ = E [log2(1 + SNRE∗)] =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1−FE∗(γ)
1 + γ
dγ,
(17)
where Pcov,R(γ) is the complementary cumulative distribution
function (CCDF) of the average rate from the associated UAV
to the typical receiver which is derived in (18) of Theorem 1,
and FE∗(γ) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the average rate of the most detrimental eavesdropper which
is derived in Theorem 2, γ is the threshold (γ > 0).
Theorem 1: The CCDF of SINRR at the typical receiver
Pcov,R is defined as the probability that the received SINRR is
greater than the threshold γ, i.e.,
Pcov,R(γ) =
∫ CR
0
PRL(x, γ)f|lR,o|(x)pU,L(x)dx
+
∫ CR
0
PRN(x, γ)f|lR,o|(x)pU,N(x)dx, (18)
where PRL(x, γ) and PRN(x, γ) are given in (19) and (20) below
PRL(x, γ) ≈
mL∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
(
mL
n
)
e−sLσ
2
e−AIu (sL,λu,PU),
(19)
PRN(x, γ) ≈
mN∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
(
mN
n
)
e−sNσ
2
e−AIu (sN,λu,PU),
(20)
in which AIu(sL, λu, PU) is given in (23) shown at the top of
the next page. x(ϑ) used in (23) is the shortest distance from
the interference UAV BS’s to the associated UAV BS which
is given by
x(ϑ) = 2x |cosϑ| . (21)
CR(ϑ) in (23) denotes the upper limit integral of u and is
given by
CR(ϑ) = CR sin
(
pi − sin−1(x sinϑCR )− ϑ
)
/ sinϑ, (22)
where CR is given in Corollary 1.
Proof 1: Please see Appendix A.
With Theorem 1, we can evaluate the average achievable
rate from the associated UAV to the typical receiver RR.
Next, we proceed to derive the CDF between the associ-
ated UAV and the most detrimental eavesdropper, which is
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The CDF of the received SNR from the
associated UAV BS at the most detrimental eavesdropper is
derived as
FE∗(γ) = exp {−2piλE ×∫ CE
0
[TL (γ, y) pU,L(y) + TN (γ, y) pU,N(y)] ydy
}
,
(26)
where
Tq (γ, y) ≈
∏
i,j∈{M,m}
PUiP
E
j
mq∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
(
mq
n
)
e
−nηqγL(y)
αqσ2
PUG
U
i
GE
j
β .
(27)
Proof 2: The horizontal distance y denoted the distance
between the associated UAV to the most detrimental eaves-
dropper. The rest proof is provided in Appendix B.
Substituting (18) and (26) into (16) and (17) respectively,
we can obtain the desired average secrecy rate (15).
V. TRANSMIT JAMMING-AIDED UAV NETWORKS
Transmit jamming is an effective measure to degrade the
quality of eavesdroppers’ received signals. However, it is an
unproven idea to enhance the UAV communication security. In
this section, we propose the concept of UAV transmit jamming
and analyze its performance. To be specific, part of the UAVs
in ΦJU ⊆ ΦU with density ελU will only transmit jamming
signals to confound eavesdroppers, and the rest UAVs in ΦSU ⊆
ΦU with density (1 − ε)λU are used to support information
transmission. 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 is the jamming factor.
With transmit jamming, the SINR at the typical receiver
becomes
SINR(J)R =
PU|ho|2GUMGRML (|LR,o|)
I(S)R + I(J)R + σ2
, (28)
where I(S)R =
∑
l∈ΦSU \o
PU|hl|2GUiGRjL (|LR,l|) is the interference
from those UAVs in ΦSU which transmit signal to other ground
receivers excluding the associated UAV BS at ’o’, and I(J)R =∑
k∈ΦJU
PU|hk|2GUi′GRjL (|LR,k|) is the jamming signals sent from
jamming UAVs in ΦJU . Gi′ denote the antenna gains from the
jamming UAVs. Notice that in transmit jamming-aided UAV
networks, the density of UAVs that a typical receiver can be
associated to is reduced to (1 − ε)λU, so the approximated
MHC distribution is derived as follows:
f
(J)
|lR,o|(x) = 2pi(1− ε)λUx exp(−pi(1− ε)λUx2). (29)
The SINR at the most detrimental eavesdropper is given by
SINR(J)E∗ = max
e∈ΦE
{
PU|he|2GUiGEjL (|Lo,e|)
I(J)E + σ2E
}
, (30)
where I(J)E =
∑
k∈ΦJU
ηPU|hk|2GUi′GEjL (|Le,k|) is the jamming
signal from the jamming UAVs.
According to (15), the average achievable secrecy rate for
the jamming-aided UAV transmission now becomes
R
(J)
Sec =
[
R
(J)
R −R(J)E∗
]+
, (31)
where the expressions of R(J)R and can be found in (16)
and (17), by replacing Pcov,R(γ) by P(J)cov,R(γ) and FE∗(γ) by
F (J)E∗ (γ), where P(J)cov,R(γ) is the CCDF of (32) in Theorem
3, and F (J)E∗ (γ) is the CDF from (36) in Theorem 4 below,
respectively.
Theorem 3: The CCDF of SINR(J)R in jamming-aided net-
works can be obtained as
P(J)cov,R(γ) =
∫ CE
0
PU,(J)L (x, γ)f
(J)
|lR,o|(x)pU,L(x)dx
+
∫ CE
0
PU,(J)N (x, γ)f
(J)
|lR,o|(x)pU,N(x)dx, (32)
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7AqIu (λu, PU) ≈
∑
i,j∈{M,m}
PUiP
R
j{
λu
−1
∫ 2pi
0
∫ min[max[2ρ,x¯(ϑ)],C¯R(ϑ)]
max[ρ,x¯(ϑ)]
[
ΩqL
(
u, ϑ,GUiG
R
j
)
pU,L(u) + Ω
q
N
(
u, ϑ,GUiG
R
j
)
pU,N(u)
]
uζ(2) (u) dudϑ
+ λu
∫ 2pi
0
∫ C¯R(ϑ)
max[2ρ,x¯(ϑ)]
[
ΩqL
(
u, ϑ,GUiG
R
j
)
pU,L(u) + Ω
q
N
(
u, ϑ,GUiG
R
j
)
pU,N(u)
]
ududϑ
}
,
(23)
where
ΩqL
(
u, ϑ,GUiG
R
j
)
= 1−
(
1 +
nηqγ
(
x2 +H2U
)αq/2
GUiG
R
j
(x2 + u2 − 2xu cosϑ+H2U )αL/2GUMGRMmL
)−mL
, (24)
ΩqL
(
u, ϑ,GUiG
R
j
)
= 1−
(
1 +
nηqγ
(
x2 +H2U
)αq/2
GUiG
R
j
(x2 + u2 − 2xu cosϑ+H2U )αN/2GUMGRMmN
)−mN
. (25)
TABLE I: 3D UPA Antenna Pattern [20].
Number of antenna elements N` = 4, 16
Half-power Beamwidth (θa = θe = θd)
√
3√
N`
Main-lobe gain (GM) N`
Side-lobe gain (Gm)
√
N`−
√
3
2pi
N` sin(3pi/2
√
N`)√
N`−
√
3
2pi
sin(3pi/2
√
N`)
where PU,(J)L (x, γ) and P
U,(J)
N (x, γ) are given in (33) and (34),
respectively, at the top of the next page.
Proof 3: It can be proved by following a similar approach
in Theorem 1.
Theorem 4: The CDF of SINR(J)E∗ in jamming-aided UAV
networks can be obtained as
F (J)E∗ (γ) = exp {−2piλE∫ CE
0
[WL (γ, y) pU,L(y) + WN (γ, y) pU,N(y)] ydy
}
, (36)
where CE in (36) is given by (4), CE(ϑE) in (38) denotes the
upper limit of the integral of u, and is expressed as
CE(ϑE) = CE sin
(
pi − sin−1(y sinϑECE )− ϑE
)
/ sinϑE, (37)
where CE is given in Corollary 1 and Wq(γ, y) is given in
(38) at the top of this page.
Proof 4: Please see Appendix C.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we provide numerical results for the av-
erage achievable secrecy rate in the UAV-enabled mmWave
networks. We assume that the uniform planar array (UPA)
is used and modeled as a sectorized pattern, and the asso-
ciated parameters are shown in Table I. Notice that the 3-
dB beamwidth and the number of antennas have an inverse
relationship. We assume that the LoS connection probability
is given by [12]
pU,L(x) =
1
1 + a exp
(−b [arctan (HUx )− a]) , (41)
TABLE II: Parameter Values.
Parameters Values
Number of Antenna (N`) 4,16
Safety distance (ρ) 10 m
Nakagami parameter for LoS link (mL) 3
Nakagami parameter for NLoS link (mN) 2
Altitude of UAV (HU) 200m
Constant values in the Urban Environment (a, b) 9.6, 0.28
Transmit power of UAV nodes PU 20 dBm
Path loss exponents at fc=28 GHz [38] αL=2,αN=3
Available bandwidth (BW) 1 GHz
Noise figure Nf 10 dB
Noise power (σ2o = σ
2
E )
−170 + 10 log10(BW)
+Nf dBm
where ϕ` = arctan
(
HU
x
)
is elevation angle, and a and b
are constant values which depend on the environment (rural,
urban, dense urban, etc.). Other system parameters are given
in Table II, unless otherwise specified.
Fig. 5 shows the effects of the UAV transmit power on the
average achievable rates. The analytical curves are obtained
from (16) and (17) respectively, which are validated by the
Monte Carlo simulation marked by ’+’. The numbers of
NR and NE are shown in the figure. Note that although the
individual receivers and eavesdroppers’ rates increase with
the UAV transmit power, we observe that there exists an
optimal transmit power value for maximizing the average
achievable secrecy rate when the typical receiver is equipped
with NR = 16 antennas.
Fig. 6 shows the effects of the UAV transmit power on
the average secrecy rate. We observe that when the antenna
number of eavesdroppers NE is reduced from 16 to 4, or the
antenna number of the legitimate ground receiver NR increases
from 4 to 16, the secrecy rate improves dramatically. This is
because the 3-dB beamwidths in the azimuth and elevation
directions are inversely proportional to
√
NR and
√
NE
3,
therefore less antennas will result in smaller coverage range
for receivers.
3Note that we have assumed the UPA for each mmWave node.
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8PU,(J)L (x, γ) ≈
mL∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
(
mL
n
)
e−sLσ
2
e−A
L
IU ((1−ε)λU,PU)e−B
L
IU (ελU,PU), (33)
PU,(J)N (x, γ) ≈
mN∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
(
mN
n
)
e−sNσ
2
e−A
N
IU ((1−ε)λU,PU)e−B
N
IU (ελU,PU), (34)
BqIu (ελu, PU) ≈
∑
i,j∈{M,m}
PUi′P
R
j×{
[ελU]
−1
∫ 2pi
0
∫ min[2ρ,C¯R(ϑ)]
ρ
[
ΩqL
(
u, PU, G
U
i′G
R
j
)
pU,L(u) + Ω
q
N
(
u, PU, G
U
i′G
R
j
)
pU,N(u)
]
uζ(2) (u) dudϑ
+ ελU
∫ 2pi
0
∫ C¯R(ϑ)
2ρ
[
ΩqL
(
u, PU, G
U
i′G
R
j
)
pU,L(u) + Ω
q
N
(
u, PU, G
U
i′G
R
j
)
pU,N(u)
]
ududϑ
}
.
(35)
Wq (γ, y) ≈
mq∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
(
mq
n
)∏
i,i′,j∈{M,m} P
U
iP
U
i′P
R
j exp
{
−nηqγL(y)
αq
PUGUiG
R
jβ
σ2 − [ελU]−1
×
∫ 2pi
0
∫ min[2ρ,C¯E(ϑE)]
ρ
(
Ω
q,(J)
L
(
u, ϑE, G
U
i , G
U
i′
)
pU,L(u) + Ω
q,(J)
N
(
u, ϑE, G
U
i , G
U
i′
)
pU,N(u)
)
uζ(2) (u) dudϑE
− ελU
∫ 2pi
0
∫ C¯E(ϑE)
2ρ
(
Ω
q,(J)
L
(
u, ϑE, G
U
i , G
U
i′
)
pU,L(u) + Ω
q,(J)
N
(
u, ϑE, G
U
i , G
U
i′
)
pU,N(u)
)
ududϑE
}
(38)
where
Ω
q,(J)
L
(
u, ϑE, G
U
i , G
U
i′
)
= 1−
(
1 +
nηqγ
(
y2 +H2U
)αq/2
GUi′
(y2 + u2 − 2yu cosϑE +H2U )αL/2GUimL
)−mL
, (39)
Ω
q,(J)
N
(
u, ϑE, G
U
i , G
U
i′
)
= 1−
(
1 +
nηqγ
(
y2 +H2U
)αq/2
GUi′
(y2 + u2 − 2yu cosϑE +H2U )αL/2GUimN
)−mN
. (40)
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Fig. 5: The effects of the UAV transmit power on the average
rates, with λU = 100/km2, λE = 300/km2, HU = 300m,ρ =
10m.
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Fig. 7: The effects of the UAV density on the average secrecy
rates, with PU = 30 dBm and NR = 16, NE = 16, ρ = 10 m.
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Fig. 7 shows the effects of the UAV densities on the average
secrecy rate. It can be observed that there exists an optimal
density of UAVs to maximize the average secrecy rate in the
PPP model, and when λP is higher than 150/km2, the average
secrecy rate starts to decrease. That is because as the density
of UAVs increase, the MHC point process is more evenly
distributed than the PPP. The minimum distance helps limit the
effect of interference, which could avoid some concentrated
interference around serving UAV-enabled BS, so the average
secrecy rate can keep increasing. However, in the PPP model,
as the density of UAVs increases, it will help the typical
user connect to the nearest UAV-enabled BS first but then the
performance will be limited by the interference.
Fig. 8 shows the effects of the UAV altitudes on the average
rates. It’s seen that high altitudes will dramatically reduce the
 ǫ
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 a
ch
ie
va
bl
e 
ra
te
 (b
it/s
/H
z)
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
RR,λU=100/km
2
RE,λU=100/km
2
RSec,λU=100/km
2
RR,λU=400/km
2
RE,λU=400/km
2
RSec,λU=400/km
2
Fig. 9: The effects of the UAV jamming factor on the average
rate, with PU = 30 dBm, NU = 4, NR = 16, NE = 4 and
λE = 600/km2.
achievable rate of the typical user but only slightly degrade
the most aggressive eavesdropper’s rate. That is because as the
altitude of the UAV BS increases, the received signal at the
typical receiver will be much weaker but the signal received
at the eavesdropper is not affected much because their antenna
gains are low in mmWave links.
Fig. 9 shows the impact of the jamming factor ε (i.e., the
percentage of UAVs that transmit jamming signals) on the
average achievable rates when the eavesdroppers’ density is
λE = 600/km2. It is easy to see that as the density of jamming
UAVs increases, both the typical receiver and the eavesdrop-
per’s rates will be reduced due to the increased interference.
However, the secrecy rate is not changing monotonically, but
there is an optimal ε to maximize the average achievable
secrecy rate which is marked with red squares. In the simulated
system, using 70% UAVs to transmit jamming signals leads
to near optimal secrecy rate. That can be explained by the
fact using appropriate amount of UAVs to send the jamming
signals will reduce the eavesdropper’s rate more than the
typical receiver’s rate.
Fig. 10 shows the impact of the minimum distance of ρ on
the average secrecy rate without jamming signals. We assume
each curve has the same initial PPP density λP. It is observed
that as the minimum distance ρ increases, the MHC point
process tend to be thinner and less UAVs will be deployed,
therefore the secrecy rate will decrease as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed the secrecy performance of 3D UAV-
enabled mmWave networks taking into account practical prop-
agation characteristics and system deployment constraints. A
tractable approach was developed to evaluate the 3D antenna
gain of the air-to-ground links. The MHC point process has
been employed to guarantee the safety distance between the
randomly deployed UAV BSs. Furthermore, we proposed
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to use part of UAVs to transmit jamming signals to the
eavesdroppers and characterized the improved secrecy perfor-
mance. Simulation results demonstrate the impact of system
parameters on the secrecy rate. Our analysis also shows that
optimizing the jamming factor of the UAV network will indeed
improve the secrecy rate. This paper focuses on the fixed
ground user scenario. As an important future direction, UAV
trajectory optimization to track mobility users [39] is worth
further study.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Based on the fact that the typical receiver is associated with
different types (LoS or NLoS) of UAV-enabled BSs ΦLU or
ΦNU with probability pU,L or pU,N, the conditional coverage
probability can be derived as
Pcov,R(γ) =
∫ CR
0
P [SINRR > γ] f|lR,o|(x)dx
=
∫ CR
0
P
[
PtG
U
MG
R
M|ho|2βL(x)−αL
ILR + INR + σ2
> γ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
PRL(x,γ)
f|lR,o|(x)pU,L(x)dx
+
∫ CR
0
P
[
PtG
U
MG
R
M|ho|2βL(x)−αN
ILR + INR + σ2
> γ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
PRN(x,γ)
f|lR,o|(x)pU,N(x)dx,
(A.1)
where L(x) =
√
x2 +HU
2 is the distance from the associated
UAV-enabled BS to the typical receiver, and x is the corre-
sponding horizontal distance. Note that |ho|2 is a normalized
gamma random variable with the parameter mq . f|R,o|(x) is
given by (14). Then, we have the following approximation of
the coverage probability with given distance x for the LoS
link:
PRL(x, γ) = P
[
ho >
γL(x)
αL
PUGUMG
R
Mβ
(ILR + INR + σ2)]
(a)≈ 1− EΦU
[(
1− e−
ηLγL(x)
αL
PUG
U
MG
R
Mβ
(ILR +INR +σ2)
)mL]
=
mL∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
(
mL
n
)
E
[
e
−nηLγL(x)αL
PUG
U
MG
R
Mβ
(ILR +INR +σ2)
]
=
mL∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
(
mL
n
)
e−sLσ
2LILR (sL)LINR (sL) ,
(A.2)
and the coverage rate for the NLoS link can be computed as
PRN(x, γ) = P
[
ho >
γL(x)
αN
PUGUMG
R
Mβ
(ILR + INR + σ2)]
≈
mN∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
(
mN
n
)
e−sNσ
2LILR (sN)LINR (sN) ,
(A.3)
where ηL = mL(mL!)
− 1mL , ηN = mN(mN!)
− 1mN , and we
have used the assumption that mL and mN are integers,
and ΦLU and Φ
N
U are independent. (a) comes from Appendix
A of [33] . We assume sq(x) =
nηqγL(x)
αq
PUGUMG
R
Mβ
. By applying
the stochastic geometry, the LoS interference EΦLU \o can be
derived as
LILR (sq) = EΦLU\o
[
e−sqI
L
R
]
= E
exp
−sq ∑
l∈ΦLU\o
∑
i,j∈{M,m}
PUiP
R
j
PU|hl|2GUiGRjβ
L(u)
αL
)}
(b)
=
∏
i,j∈{M,m}
PUiP
R
j exp
{−λU−1×{∫ 2pi
0
∫ u(1)max(ϑ)
u
(1)
min(ϑ)
ΩqL
(
u, PU, G
U
iG
R
j
)
upU,L(R(u))ζ
(2) (u) dudϑ
+
∫ 2pi
0
∫ u(2)max(ϑ)
u
(2)
min(ϑ)
ΩqL
(
u, PU, G
U
iG
R
j
)
upU,L(R(u))λ
2
Ududϑ
}
} ,
(A.4)
where (b) comes from the Laplace function of the MHC point
process with ΦLU , and notice that |hl|2 is a normalized gamma
random variable with the parameter mL for the small scale
fading. Fig. 11 shows the interference range, u is the integral
variable from the original point ’o’ to ’l’ which denotes the
distance from the associated UAV BS to the interference UAV.
ΩqL
(
u, PU, G
U
iG
R
j
)
is given as follows,
ΩqL
(
u, PU, G
U
iG
R
j
)
= 1−
(
1 +
nηqγL(x)
αqGUiG
R
j
L(R(u))
αLGUMG
R
MmL
)−mL
,
(A.5)
where R(u) is given as R(u) =
√
x2 + u2 − 2xu cosϑ. Based
on R(u), we can write down the distance L(R(u)) from the
associated UAV BS to the typical receiver as
L(R(u)) =
√
x2 + u2 − 2xu cosϑ+H2U . (A.6)
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Fig. 11: Diagram of the MHC point process interference
distance.
From trigonometry in Fig. 11, we can see that the lower
integral limit of u for the horizontal distance from the typical
user to interference UAV BS is equal to x since the closest
interference UAV BS is at least at a distance x(ϑ) on the
projection plane, which is given by
x(ϑ) = 2x |cosϑ| . (A.7)
Similarly, we denote the upper integral limit of u to the UAV
maximum connection distance, which is given by
CR(ϑ) = CR sin
(
pi − sin−1(x sinϑCR )− ϑ
)
/ sinϑ. (A.8)
Based on the above results, the integral limits for ρ < u <
2ρ in (10) are given by{
u(1)max(ϑ) = min
[
max [2ρ, x(ϑ)] , CR(ϑ)
]
u
(1)
min(ϑ) = max [ρ, x(ϑ)]
, (A.9)
and when u ≥ 2ρ in (10), the integral limits are given by4{
u(2)max(ϑ) = CR(ϑ)
u
(2)
min(ϑ) = max [2ρ, x(ϑ)]
. (A.10)
Finally, we have ζ(2)(u) = 0 when u < ρ.
Using a similar approach in (A.4), we derive the interference
coming from NLoS links as follows
LINR (sq) = EΦLU\o
[
e−sqI
N
U
]
=
∏
i,j∈{M,m}
PUiP
R
j exp
{−λU−1×{∫ 2pi
0
∫ u(1)max(ϑ)
u
(1)
min(ϑ)
ΩqN
(
u, PU, G
U
iG
R
j
)
upU,N(R(u))ζ
(2) (u) dudϑ
+
∫ 2pi
0
∫ u(2)max(ϑ)
u
(2)
min(ϑ)
ΩqN
(
u, PU, G
U
iG
R
j
)
upU,N(R(u))λ
2
Ududϑ
}
}
,
(A.11)
4Note that we ignore the worst case scenario where ρ > CR(ϑ) and assume
that CR(ϑ) is always greater than 2ρ.
and ΩqN
(
u, PU, G
U
iG
R
j
)
is given by
ΩqN
(
u, PU, G
U
iG
R
j
)
= 1−
(
1 +
nηqγL(x)
αqGUiG
R
j
L(R(u))
αLGUMG
R
MmN
)−mN
.
(A.12)
After that, we can obtain the CDF of the SINR in (18), and
this completes the proof.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Define FE∗(·) as the CDF of the SNR of the most detri-
mental eavesdropper, which can be written as
FE∗(γ) = P (SNRE∗ < γ)
= P
(
max
{
SNRLE∗ ,SNR
N
E∗
}
< γ
)
.
(B.1)
By using the thinning theorem in the point process, we
divide the eavesdroppers into the LoS point process ΦLE
with density λEpU,L(r) and the NLoS point process ΦNE with
density λEpU,N(r), respectively. Different from the UAVs,
eavesdroppers do not have safety distance between each other.
Accordingly, we express (B.1) as
FE∗(γ) = P
(
SNRLE∗ < γ
) · P (SNRNE∗ < γ) . (B.2)
Pr
(
SNRLE∗ < γ
)
is derived as
P
(
SNRLE∗ < γ
)
= E
∏
e∈ΦLE
Pr
(
PU|he|2GUiGRiβ
L(y)
αLσ2
< γ
)
= exp
{
−2piλE
∫ √C2E +H2U
HU
(
1− Pr
(
PUheG
U
iG
E
iβ
LαLσ2
< γ
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
TL(L(y),γ)
× pU,L(
√
L2 −H2U )LdL
}
= exp
{
−2piλE
∫ CE
0
TL (y, γ) pU,L(y)ydy
}
,
(B.3)
where |he|2 in (B.3) is a normalized gamma random variable
with the parameter mL. Similarly, we derive Pr
(
SNRNE∗ < γ
)
below:
P
(
SNRNE∗ < γ
)
= E
 ∏
e∈ΦNE
Pr
(
PU|he|2GUiGEiβ
L(y)
αNσ2
< γ
)
= exp
{
−2piλE
∫ CE
0
TN (y, γ) pU,N(y)ydy
}
,
(B.4)
where |he|2 in (B.4) is a normalized gamma random variable
with the parameter mN. Tq, q ∈ {L,N} in (B.3) and (B.4)
is obtained using (B.5) below based on the law of the total
probability:
Tq (y, γ) =
∏
i,j∈{M,m}
PUiP
E
j Pr
(
he >
γL(y)
αq
PUGUiG
E
jβ
σ2
)
. (B.5)
Substituting (B.3) and (B.4) into (B.2), we can derive (26)
and this completes the proof.
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APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 4
It can be proved by following a similar approach shown in
Appendix B for Theorem 2, where Wq (γ, y) is given by
Wq (γ, y) = Pr
(
he >
γL(y)
αq
PUβ
(
σ2 + I
(J)
E
))
≈
mq∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
(
mq
n
) ∏
i,i′,j∈{M,m}
PUiP
U
i′P
E
j×{
e
−nηqγL(y)
αq
PUG
U
i
GE
j
β L
I
(J)
E
(
nηqγL(y)
αq
PUGUiG
E
jβ
)}
.
(C.1)
L
I
(J)
E
(·) = L
I
L,(J)
E
(·) · L
I
N,(J)
E
(·) is obtained by the basic
principle of the MHC point process with LoS jamming UAVs
with the density ελU, for LoS link with ελUpU,L(u) and NLoS
jamming UAVs with the density ελUpU,N(u), respectively. The
proof of L
I
L,(J)
E
and L
I
N,(J)
E
are similar to (A.4) in Appendix
A.
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